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Abstract: Based on the cases of Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, this article reviews 
the court judgments and discussions about the criminal charges of “inciting 
subversion of state power” and “disrupting public order” used against Liu Xiaobo 
and Xu Zhiyong respectively. Through a review of the discourses of Chinese legal 
scholars surrounding the two cases, we focus on the conflicting arguments regarding 
the Chinese Constitution and the Constitutional right to freedom of expression. This 
article concludes with an analysis of the political meaning of the two cases by 
revisiting the debate about the implementation of a constitutional review and by 
reflecting upon the political contention between the government's recent re-
ideologization of the Constitution against the growing calls of Chinese citizens who 
advocate Constitutionalism as a proxy for political reform. 
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Introduction 
 
On 25 December 2009, Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Laureate, was sentenced to eleven 
years imprisonment by the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court for “inciting subversion 
of state power”.1 
Five years later, on 26 January 2014, Xu Zhiyong, a human rights activist and university 
law professor, was sentenced to four years in prison for “gathering a crowd to disrupt public 
order” by the same court. 
Although the two cases occurred five years apart and were judged according to different 
rules under the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter referred to as 
Criminal Law), the activities that caused each prosecution are both related to specific basic 
rights as stated by the Chinese Constitution i.e. the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
assembly. And both cases have reflected the different interpretations and understandings of 
judges, lawyers, and legal scholars on how the Chinese Constitution should be taken into 
consideration in criminal cases. These different discourses have conflicting political 
implications. Furthermore, both cases have reflected the wider Constitutional debate that has 
been ongoing in China.  
What are the similarities and differences between the two cases?  How do the two cases 
reflect and relate to the political background of China’s Constitutional debate? And how do 
the two cases contribute to the ongoing Constitutional debate in today’s China? 
Examining the interpretation and application of the law as reflected in the cases of Liu 
Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, this article reaffirms that the different discourses reveal the 
complexity and politicization of interpreting Chinese law in politically sensitive cases. It also 
emphasizes that while the authority opposes the application of the Constitution and refuses to 
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respect constitutional rights, the pro-Constitutionalists have never ceased fighting for the 
reverse.  However, by revisiting the political background behind China’s Constitutional 
debate, this article argues that the authorities adopted the strategy of re-ideologizing the 
Constitution in order to forestall its judicialization and that this has continued to jeopardize 
the prospects of Constitutionalism in China. 
First, this article briefly introduces the two crimes and the court rationales in the two cases. 
Second, it examines the different discourses about the application of the Constitution in the 
two cases, and thirdly, it analyzes how the two cases relate and reflect China’s ongoing 
Constitutional debate. 
 
1. The Two Crimes and the Two Cases 
 
1.1 Inciting Subversion of State power 
 
Under the section of “Endangering State Security Crimes” (weifan guojia an’quan zui) in the 
Chinese Criminal Law, two crimes are stipulated in Article 105. The first subsection - Article 
105(1) - sets out the crime of subversion of state power (dianfu guojia zhengquan zui): 
 
Among those who organize, plot or carry out the scheme of subverting the State power or 
overthrowing the socialist system, the ringleaders and others who commit major crimes shall 
be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years; those 
who take an active part in it shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
three years but not more than 10 years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, public surveillance or 
deprivation of political rights.  
 
The second subsection - Article 105(2) – stipulates the crime of inciting subversion of state 
power (shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui): 
 
Whoever incites others by spreading rumours or slanders or any other means to subvert the 
State power or overthrow the socialist system shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance or deprivation of political 
rights; and ringleaders and others who commit major crimes shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than five years. 
 
Although the two crimes are closely related, they differ from each other. The first crime 
relates to direct “organizing, plotting, or carrying out” subversive acts; and the second crime 
relates to “inciting others” to subvert state power by “spreading rumours or slanders or any 
other means”. In other words, “subversion” refers to a situation where individuals are 
personally involved in actions that are aimed at overthrowing the political system; and 
“inciting subversion” is “an offense of expression in which the danger lies in the alleged 
potential for that expression to lead others to want to overthrow the political system” 
(Rosenzweig, 2012). Therefore, “inciting subversion of state power” relates to  the expression 
and the words. The crime Liu Xiaobo was charged with is “inciting subversion of state 
power”. 
There are two conditions that constitute the crime of “inciting subversion of state power”: 
(1) the actions of using rumor or slander or other means to incite subversion of state power 
and overthrow the socialist system; (2) the intention of the actor to incite the public to subvert 
state power or overthrow the socialist system (Peng, 2014, p. 97). The punishment for this 
crime includes two degrees: less than five years and longer. Ringleaders or those whose 
crimes are “severe” (yanzhong) are to be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not less 
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than five years.2 Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years for “inciting subversion of state 
power”. According to the court judgment, his actions of inciting subversion of state power 
“lasted for a long period, his articles were widely spread and had vile influence, and he 
should be given severe punishment according to law.”3  
The evidence on which the court sentenced him to a long-term imprisonment is his role in 
Charter 08, and six of his articles4  which were published on websites5  hosted overseas. 
According to the Court Verdict, certain words6 from the titles of his articles were interpreted 
as evidence of “fabricated rumours” and “defamation”7 , and other words8  were used as 
evidence of “incitement”. The prosecution also used the number of page views Liu Xiaobo’s 
texts received on the Internet to prove that they were widely disseminated and thereby incited 
many others to “subvert state power” and “overthrow the socialist system.”9 
 
1.2 Gathering a Crowd to Disrupt Public Order 
 
Under the section of “Crimes of Obstructing the Administration of Public Order” 
(fanghai shehui guanli zhixu zui) in the Criminal Law, Article 291 sets out the crime of 
“gathering a crowd to disrupt public order” (Juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu zui) on which Xu 
Zhiyong's sentence was based.  Article 291 stipulates that:  
 
Where people are gathered to disrupt order at railway stations or bus terminals, wharves, civil 
airports, marketplaces, parks, theatres, cinemas, exhibition halls, sports grounds or other 
public places, or to block traffic or undermine traffic order, or resist or obstruct public 
security administrators of the State from carrying out their duties according to law, if the 
circumstances are serious, the ringleaders shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 
not more than five years, criminal detention or public surveillance. 
 
According to the Court's verdict, Xu Zhiyong's sentence of four years imprisonment was 
based on the following reasons: “Xu used social issues of great public concern to repeatedly 
organize and plan congregation in public venues that disrupted public order by resisting and 
obstructing public security administration personnel to perform their lawful duty.” 10  The 
social issues were an equal right to education, and the disclosure by government official of 
their assets.11 
The court sentenced him to four years imprisonment for acting as the “ringleader” who 
organized other citizens to take action in circumstances deemed “serious.” The Police and 
Prosecution used his calls for assembly through his Tencent Weibo account as evidence that 
he committed the crime of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.” 12 
 
2. Arguments about the Application of the Constitution in the Two Cases  
 
Both Liu and Xu were exercising their Constitutional rights to freedom of expression and, in 
Xu’s case, freedom of assembly as well. In both cases, constitutional rights are clearly 
involved. However, courtroom arguments from the defendants’ lawyers showed great 
contrast to those of the prosecution and judges. While the lawyers endeavored to connect the 
Constitutional rights with the defendants’ actions, the Court did just the opposite. 
 
2.1 Liu Xiaobo's Case 
 
An article written by two Taiwanese scholars has shown that in practice Article 105 was 
initially implemented by the Chinese government as a political tool to control public opinion 
and freedom of expression; following the amended Criminal Law which went into force on 1 
October 1997 (Xu and Chen, 2014). 
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Liu’s lawyers (Ding Xikui and Shang Baojun) stated in their defense that freedom of 
expression13 is a crucial issue that should be taken into account in the defendant’s case. They 
specifically called attention to the fact that the difference between the prosecution and the 
defense was that Liu Xiaobo’s incriminating words should fall under the scope of the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Chinese Constitution.14   
In the whole defense statement, freedom of expression is cited eleven times, and the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Hereafter referred to as Constitution) is 
mentioned thirteen times.15 The defense lawyers further argued that the charges against Liu 
blurred the boundary between a citizen’s freedom of expression and a criminal offence. 
Moreover, they argued that “[e]ven if the critical opinions published by Liu Xiaobo directed 
at the Communist Party of China and state organs prove to be wrong, they still fall under the 
category of a citizen’s freedom of expression”. 16 
Although the actions of Liu Xiaobo clearly relate to the freedom of expression, a basic 
right stipulated by Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution, it is only mentioned three times in 
the First Instance Court Verdict. The first two mentions are in the Court’s restating of the 
arguments made by the defendant and his lawyer. 17  The third mention is the Court’s 
concluding statement that Liu Xiaobo’s actions exceed the limit of freedom of expression and 
constitute a criminal offense.18    
Although it is not surprising that the defense lawyers’ opinion differs from the public 
prosecutor and the court, their divergent attitudes towards taking the Constitution into 
consideration – or not in Liu Xiaobo’s case, clearly show the unwillingness of judicial 
authorities to discuss the scope of the Constitutional rights.    
In contrast, Liu's lawyers also used Article 33, Article 35, Article 41 and Article 47 of the 
Chinese Constitution which stipulate, respectively, that the State should respect and protect 
human rights, that citizens have the right to freedom of expression, to free publication, and to 
criticize the government. While the Chinese Constitution is not supposed to be directly 
recognized in Chinese Courts, especially in criminal cases, Liu’s lawyers chose nonetheless 
to deliberately refer to these Constitutional articles. By doing so, they acted “as if” the 
Court’s application of the Constitution was the generally accepted norm and thereby 
strategically challenged the interpretation of Article 105(2) imposed by the political 
authorities. Nevertheless, while the lawyers argued that their client’s actions and freedom of 
expression should be constitutionally protected, the authorities nevertheless asserted that 
“state security” prevails over citizens’ constitutional rights.   
 
2.2 Xu Zhiyong's Case 
 
In Xu Zhiyong’s case, his lawyers (Zhang Qingfang and Yang Jinzhu) first chose not to 
express any defense statement in/as a silent protest against what they considered a show 
trial.19 Although his case is clearly related to Constitutional rights and Xu Zhiyong himself 
cited them in his closing statement,20 the first-instance Court verdict did not mention them. 
Xu argued that although the accusation by the prosecutor of “disrupting public order” appears 
to be an issue on the limits of a citizen’s right to freedom of expression, it is in fact an issue 
of whether a citizen’s Constitutional right are to be recognized or not. 21 
In contrast, Xu’s third defense lawyer Liu Shuqing cited freedom of expression nineteen 
times in the appeal statement of the second instance trial. In addition to pointing out that there 
were unclear issues and major procedural mistakes in the first instance court judgment, he 
specifically emphasized that freedom of expression was the main issue involved in Xu’s 
case. 22  He pointed out that freedom of expression should include the “more meaningful 
freedom to criticize, which in the modern society is the right to criticize the government” and 
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that freedom of expression and its derivative rights should all be guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 23 
Similar to Liu Xiaobo's defense lawyers, Xu’s lawyer, Liu Shuqing, quoted Article 35 of 
the Chinese Constitution and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights24 , 
both of which express the importance of a legally protected freedom of expression as a 
domestic and international principle.25  
Moreover, Liu Shuqing discussed in detail how the limits of freedom of expression should 
be assessed i.e. whether it caused a “clear and present danger” (jinpo de xianshi de weihai), 
echoing the doctrine established by Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Schenck v. United States when assessing the limits to freedom of expression and the scope 
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. That is, only expression intending 
to result in a crime and that poses a “clear and present” danger of succeeding shall be 
punished.26  In his appeal statement, Liu Shuqing further argued that the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations (Hereafter referred to as 
the Assembly Law) violates the Constitution and should be abolished. During Xu Zhiyong’s 
trial on 22 January 2014, seventy-seven Chinese lawyers and scholars also called for a 
judicial review of the Assembly Law.27 
 
2.3 Post-Trial Discussion  
 
Although censorship directives issued to the media by government authorities have 
prevented both cases from being widely reported or discussed by the Chinese public, a 
circumscribed discussion of each case still took place outside the courtroom. On the one hand, 
several Chinese legal scholars of liberal persuasion published their legal arguments in defense 
of Constitutional rights on websites hosted overseas, and partly accessible in China. By 
contrast, the views of pro-establishment legal scholars were quoted and reposted on several 
state media websites hosted in China.  
After Liu Xiaobo’s trial in December 2009, legal scholars such as Jiang Ping28 and He 
Weifang29 defended Liu Xiaobo’s innocence and criticized his sentence as a “punishment 
because of speech” (yinyan huozui). Conversely, the state-owned Xinhua News Agency 
quoted three Chinese law professors’ comments in support of the Court’s verdict. Since 
censorship directives instructed that “authoritative sources must prevail” on all websites 
under China’s jurisdiction by “rooting out and deleting”30 any speech in support of Liu and 
Xu, any critical opinions of Chinese internet users about the Court’s judgment were censored. 
As a result, the “authoritative sources” represent the main information about both cases that is 
available in China.  
One of the comments relating to the Constitution and freedom of expression was made by 
Professor Gao Mingxuan, the president of the International Association of Penal Law China 
Branch and the honorary Chairman of the Criminal Law Research Association of the China 
Law Society. He stated that “[a]lthough freedom of expression is an extremely important 
right of Chinese citizens and protected by China's Constitution and laws (…), citizens could 
not exercise this right without any restrictions whatsoever.”31 
The other two law professors (Chen Weidong32 and Zhao Bingzhi33) quoted by the Xinhua 
News Agency did not mention the Constitution but instead asserted that the trial did not 
violate any due process and that the sentence was made according to the Criminal Law 
because “Liu Xiaobo's file shows that he has engaged in agitation activities for a long time 
(…) through the Internet by using the network's speed and its ability to grab vast public 
attention”.34 
After Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Xinhua News Agency also published an 
interview with Professor Gao Mingxuan entitled “So-Called ‘Punishment Because of Speech’ 
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is a Misreading of the Judgment in the Liu Xiaobo Case” in which he reiterated that limits to 
free speech are consistent with China’s Criminal Law. He added that because Liu’s words 
had the “goal of inciting this so-called ‘new power’ of the people” with “the motive and 
intention to overthrow our nation's state power and existing social system,” his speech “no 
longer belongs in the category of ordinary critical speech and should be considered activity 
that poses a real threat to society.”35  
In the case of Xu Zhiyong, after the first instance court delivered its verdict in 2014, the 
Constitutional Law Professor of Peking University, Zhang Qianfan, wrote a long article 
(Zhang, 2014). In this article, Zhang argued that Xu Zhiyong’s case should be decided 
according to Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution. He specifically discussed the relationship 
between the Criminal Law and the Constitution and pointed out the following: first, the court 
mistakenly adjudicated Xu Zhiyong guilty by only applying the Criminal Law without 
mentioning the Constitution; second, all Chinese laws should be interpreted according to the 
Chinese Constitution; third, if an action itself concerns a citizen’s basic rights, even if it 
affects public order and causes a traffic jam, it should be tolerated by the government and 
society because repression of basic rights in lieu of tolerance could possibly cause even more 
serious social consequences. Zhang further stated that the Criminal Law protects a country’s 
public order, social security, and other public interests, while the Constitution protects basic 
human rights such as freedom of expression. If the Constitution does not protect freedom of 
expression, the Criminal Law can easily be turned into a tool for abridging citizens’ rights 
and maintaining autocracy, corruption, and power abuse. (Zhang, 2014) 
In response to Zhang’s article, a legal researcher named Tang Xuhui criticized Zhang’s 
argument that “if some rules under the Criminal Law clearly conflict with the Constitution, 
these rules shall be invalid”36 by counter-arguing that such a kind of judicial review is not 
appropriate for Chinese courts to apply. By citing Jiang Shigong37 who argued that “judicial 
judgment” (sifa panduan) and “judicial review” (weixian shencha) are different, he further 
counter-argued that hiding a “judicial review” under the concept of a “judicial judgment” is 
like turning the “judicialization of the Constitution” (xianfa sifahua) into a Trojan Horse. This 
Trojan Horse would then make it possible for Chinese judges and legal scholars to introduce 
an  American-style Constitutionalism into China. Considering that liberal legal scholars often 
denounce the politicization of the judiciary in China, it is noteworthy that for Tang Xuhui the 
judicial review is “not about law or justice, but about politics and power.”38  
While this discussion is limited to a few individual opinions and cannot be seen as a 
representative sample of China’s public opinion, it shows that a fundamental disagreement 
persists between liberal and pro-establishment legal scholars concerning the judicialization of 
the Constitution as a way to protect constitutional rights.  
 
3. Analyzing the Political Meaning of the Two Cases  
 
Both the Chinese Constitution and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(Hereafter referred to as ICCPR) stipulate that everyone shall enjoy freedom of expression.39 
According to General Comment No. 34, States parties shall guarantee the right to freedom of 
expression, and expression includes “political discourse, commentary on one’s own and on 
public affairs, canvasing, discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic 
expression, teaching, and religious discourse.” 40  While freedom of expression is not an 
absolute right and shall be limited to “respect of the rights or reputation of others or to the 
protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals”, the General 
Comment on ICCPR explicitly states that “when a State party impose restrictions on the 
exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”41 In the 
cases of Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, the Chinese state has put in jeopardy the constitutional 
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and international legal right to freedom of expression because they do not see these legal 
norms they committed to as imposing limits on their uses or abuses of state power.  
While liberal voices advocate the implementation of China’s Constitution, ultimately, they 
believe that only a constitutional government (xianzheng) could possibly clear a pathway to 
holding accountable a party-state whose power to intervene in the judiciary is causing 
repeated violations of constitutional rights.   
In contrast, the gongjianfa authorities 42  and pro-establishment legal scholars clearly 
oppose the idea of a constitutional government. In defense of the existing politico-legal 
system (zhengfa xitong), pro-establishment voices reject the application of the Constitution 
by China’s Courts.   
In order to clarify the political meaning of the two cases, it is necessary to move beyond 
these highly polarized positions over the judicial application of China’s Constitution43 and to 
understand their relationship to the wider debate about constitutional review, as well as the 
political context behind the two cases. 
 
3.1 The Debate about a Constitutional Review 
 
Over the last two decades, many Chinese legal scholars, lawyers, and human rights 
defenders have been pushing for the implementation of Constitutional rights by calling for a 
system of Constitutional review, if not a Constitutional court.  
According to Zhu Guobin, the different positions of Chinese legal scholars regarding the 
application of the Constitution can be grouped into four different categories:  (1) the negative 
theory : the constitution should not constitute the direct source according to which a judgment 
is to be made by the courts; (2) the positive theory / hypothesis / argument : the constitution is 
a law and should thus be implemented in trial practice; (3) the compromising theory : the 
courts in China cannot apply the constitution when adjudicating criminal cases, but can do it 
in a restrained manner in civil and administrative cases; (4) the middle-way approach: “the 
breakthrough of the application of the constitution can be achieved in the sphere of private 
law” (Zhu, 2013, p. 6). While Zhu believes that the Courts must cite the Constitution in order 
to protect citizens’ rights, he argues nonetheless that the “middle-way approach” would be 
the most feasible because it requires less constitutional reform.  
However, the “compromising theory” also seems feasible if the findings are considered 
from a study about anti-discrimination litigation cases. In these cases, state actors had to 
respond to the underlying substantive issues raised by Chinese lawyers, academics, and rights 
defenders who had pushed for a more active application of the Constitution by the Courts 
(Kellogg, 2009). Although such efforts from civil society did not generate enough pressure to 
trigger any formal constitutional reform, they did much to raise the public's rights awareness.  
While the “middle-way approach” would exclude the application of the constitution in the 
sphere of public law, legal scholars who endorse the “negative theory” would exclude it all 
together. To justify their position, those scholars often cite two decisions from the Supreme 
People’s Court (Hereafter referred to as the SPC). One is the 1955 “Reply” (pifu) to Xinjiang 
Higher People’s Court stating that “in criminal judgments, the Constitution shall not be cited 
for the basis of determination of offence and sentencing.”44 Another is the 1986 “Reply”45 to 
Jiangsu Higher People’s Court that excluded the Constitution as a basis for court decisions. 
However, whether these two replies can be considered as a sufficient justification for judges 
and legal scholars to exclude the application of the Constitution is questionable. Do they 
mean that China’s more than 3,000 courts should never refer to the Constitution in deciding 
cases? In fact, there have already been dozens of cases where Constitutional rights were 
referred to in China (Zhang, 2004, pp. 44-45; Zhu, 2013, pp. 23-26). In addition, if a 
Constitutional issue arises in a case but the Chinese courts feel they cannot cite the 
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Constitution in their judgments, the Legislation Law passed in 2000 authorizes them to refer 
to the National People's Congress (Hereafter referred to as the NPC) and its Standing 
Committee (Hereafter referred to as the NPCSC) or the SPC for a constitutional review, who 
in turn can either refer it to the NPCSC for clarification or interpretation, or use its own 
judgment (Zhu, 2013, pp. 30-31).  
This is what happened in 2001 when a Shandong Court submitted Qi Yuling's case to the 
SPC46, who interpreted that the Constitutional right to education was abridged in this case. 
Such an unprecedented interpretation indicated that the Constitution could be referred to in 
civil cases and raised hope for a “judicialization of the Constitution” or for a “reference 
(yuanyin) to the Constitution” in court decisions as a first step towards building a 
constitutional review system. In a discussion of his Court's decision in the Qi Yuling case, 
Judge Huang Songyou argued that the judiciary had an “inflexible understanding” of the 
judicial application of the Constitution in the past and hoped by reinterpreting the two replies 
as neither “thoroughly negating” nor “completely excluding” the possibility of applying the 
Constitution (cited in Shen Kui, 2003) that Chinese courts would use the Constitution.  
In 2003, after the Sun Zhigang tragedy,47 Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, and Yu Jiang used the 
“Review proposal” of the Legislation Law by sending a letter to the NPCSC that challenged 
the legality and constitutionality of the 1982 Measures on Detention and Repatriation of 
Urban Vagrants (Hereafter referred to as the Repatriation Law). Their action was widely 
reported and aroused much discussion in China. Eventually, the Repatriation Law was 
abolished by the State Council without any constitutionality review by the NPCSC. Xu 
Zhiyong later stated that their proposal aimed not only to have the Repatriation Law 
abolished, but also to initiate a constitutional review procedure by the NPCSC.48 Encouraged 
by this partial success, and the 2004 amendment that included “human rights” in the 
Constitution, Xu Zhiyong’s NGO “Open Constitution Imitative” (Gongmeng) went on 
advocating for a greater rule of law. In the following years, as a rights-defense movement 
(weiquan yundong) was emerging, many Chinese citizens also tried, in vain, to use the 
“Review proposal” to challenge the constitutionality and legality of several draconian 
measures and regulations that were drafted without public input. At the same time, the 
growing use of the new media helped to increase rights consciousness among concerned 
citizens.  
In response, a guiding opinion (zhidao yijian)49  issued in 2005 by the Beijing High 
People’s Court on the regularization of written verdicts (guifan panjueshu) yet again clearly 
stated that there should not be any direct references to the Constitution (bude zhijie yinyong 
xianfa) in court decisions, be it administrative, civil, or criminal. In April 2006, a clampdown 
on the rights-defense movement coincided with a campaign launched by Luo Gan, the head 
of the Politico-legal committee (zhengfawei), to re-solidify the Party's leadership over the 
legal field. 
In December 2007, the policy goal of “judicial independence” (sifa duli) further regressed 
with Hu Jintao’s “Three Supremes” (san ge zhishang) speech, which subordinated the law to 
the basic strategic interests of the Party.  
Eventually, the SPC formally withdrew its “Qi Yuling reply”50 in 2008, further blocking 
the way for the Constitution to be used in Chinese courts. This move took place after the 
reform-minded SPC President, Xiao Yang, was replaced in March 2008 by the more 
conservative Wang Shengjun, who re-asserted Party interests and “stability” as priorities over 
judicial independence or judicialization of the constitution.  
While it remains unclear whether or how the Constitution should be referred to in court 
decisions, it does not mean that the development of Constitutionalism in China is at a 
standstill either. In practice, many lawyers, intellectuals, and concerned citizens have been 
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trying to “reactivate the Constitution” (jihuo xianfa) (Teng, 2012a) by engaging in rights 
advocacy and promoting a Constitutional government.  
For example, the drafters of Charter 08 emphasized that “Constitutionalism is the principle 
of guaranteeing basic freedoms and rights of citizens as defined by the constitution through 
legal provisions and the rule of law, restricting and defining the boundaries of government 
power and conduct, and providing appropriate institutional capability to carry this out”.51  
At a Beijing workshop in 2008 on constitutionalism, Xu Zhiyong also encouraged Chinese 
citizens to continuously use the Constitution in order to shape and mobilize public opinion as 
a force that could affect government power in the long run (Hand, 2011, pp. 49-50).  
The dispersal of this trend in the wider community was supported by a study of the social 
media monitoring company Crimson Hexagon that located 490,000 Chinese social media 
posts between Jan. 1, 2013 and Feb. 1, 2014 mentioning “constitutionalism”, “anti-
constitutionalism”, or “socialist constitutionalism” with 84 percent of the comments evincing 
a pro-constitutionalism view (Caragliano, 2014).   
 
3.2 The Political Context behind the Two Cases 
 
Around the time of Liu Xiaobo’s trial in 2009, there were signs of a “turn against the law” 
(Minzner, 2011). Compared to 2007, the number of Chinese citizens arrested for 
“endangering state security” had more than doubled in 2008 and 2009.52 Individuals facing 
such criminal charges could not have their constitutional or legal rights protected, and their 
lawyer’s arguments were always disregarded because their client’s fate was already decided 
by Party-dominated adjudication committees.  
In 2011, as the Arab Spring was unfolding, the NPCSC chairman Wu Bangguo delivered 
his “five no's” (wu bu gao) speech at the NPC, repudiating “diversification of ideological 
guidelines” and “separation of powers,” warning that any loosening of the Party's power 
could undermine “stability” and bring about dire consequences. This speech coincided with a 
clampdown on dozens of rights defenders, including criminal defense lawyers who were 
either disappeared, detained, or charged. It signaled that the leadership regarded severe 
“stability maintenance” (weiwen) measures like the use of draconian criminal laws as 
superior tools for stability maintenance than building the rule of law by implementing the 
Constitution. Conversely, Deng Yuwen warned that “the government has failed to build an 
effective and convincing value system that can be accepted by the majority of its people.”53 
Xu Zhiyong’s trial in January 2014 took place in the middle of an anti-Constitutionalism 
campaign that started in early 2013. After Xi Jinping said on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 
Constitution that “the life of the Constitution lies in its implementation” and that it should be 
“the legal weapon for people to defend their own rights,” many voices expressed hope of 
seeing such words translated into action. However, when the New Year’s editorial of 
Southern Weekend (Nanfang zhoumo) entitled “China’s Constitutional Dream” was abruptly 
censored, it became clear that Xi Jinping only saw the Constitution as a political slogan that 
did not need to be implemented. Meanwhile, the progressive journal Yanhuang chunqiu 
whose New Year’s wish was “The Constitution is the Consensus for Political Structural 
Reform” also came under pressure. Although its editor Wu Si observed in late 2012 that 
“even the people who oppose constitutionalism do not oppose the implementation of the 1982 
Constitution,” 54  it appeared that the political situation had changed under the new 
leadership.55  
In mid-2013, a Party directive known as Document No. 9 warned cadres about “problems 
related to the current state of the ideological sphere.” Listing “seven perils that should not be 
discussed” (qi bu jiang), it first attacked “Western constitutionalism” as “an attempt to 
undermine the Party’s leadership” and to “bring about a change of allegiance by bringing 
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Western political systems to China.” 56  Anti-constitutionalist views regarded 
Constitutionalism as “an alien concept that is dangerous for China’s reform trajectory and 
political stability.” (Creemers, 2014) However, Zhang Qianfan asked how calling for an 
implementation of the Constitution could be opposed since it “naturally does not mean 
implementing the US Constitution or the constitution of any other foreign country, but means 
implementing China’s own Constitution, the Constitution that the governing party took the 
initiative to formulate in 1982.”57 
While Xu Zhiyong was busy co-organizing initiatives such as the equal education 
campaign for children of migrant workers and the disclosure of officials’ assets as part of the 
emerging New Citizens Movement (xin gongmin yundong), the anti-Constitutionalism 
campaign continued. Pro-Party voices proclaimed in official journals and major state media 
that constitutionalism is a “discursive trap” (Zheng, 2013) and “a means of abolishing the 
leadership of the CCP and the socialist system” (Wang, 2013) backed by external “hostile 
forces” (didui shili) that “belong to capitalism” (Yang, 2013). The conspiratory overtones of 
these official voices became more ominous when the legal scholar Zhang Xuezhong was 
sacked by East China University of Politics and Law after publishing a text entitled “The 
Origins and Perils of the Anti-Constitutionalism Campaign in 2013” (2013 fan xianfa niliu de 
genyuan weixian). 
As the Re-education through labor system was to be abolished by the end of the year, in 
June 2013 a directive was issued by China's national prosecutor's office asking local 
prosecutors “to pursue activists harboring political intentions by using charges of disrupting 
public order rather than subversion.”58 In its annual report on the situation of Chinese human 
rights defenders, an NGO documented for 2013 “the most severe level of suppression in over 
a decade”59 with 220 criminal detentions and arrests, a nearly three-fold increase from 2012.  
While “subversion”60  charges are most commonly used as a “pocket crime” targeting 
veteran dissidents such as Liu Xiaobo, “disrupting public order” charges are increasingly 
used against the political views61 of a younger generation of rights defenders like Xu Zhiyong, 
who usually focus on the law by widening their social reach through the new media.  
If, as Teng Biao phrased it, the degree of tolerance of the authorities is basically 
determined “by the average level of those already imprisoned” (quoted by Eva Pils, 2014), 
then the increasing number of arrests indicates that the political space for voices expressing 
different political views than the regime became much tighter in recent years, as shown by 
the silencing of Xu Zhiyong’s voice.  
For over a decade, Chinese rights defenders have aimed at defusing various politically 
sensitive issues by trying to peacefully resolve them through non-ideological uses of the law 
and the constitution. They acted “as if” those “inside the system” (tizhinei) had already 
discarded the ideological legacy of Mao’s era that promoted an enemy mentality. However, 
the authorities eventually reverted back to a Maoist mind-set by seeing or framing the 
emergence of rights defenders as a threat. As a result, they suppressed them  
in the name of “state security” and “public order.”  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The two cases discussed in this article have occurred during a Constitutional debate and have 
contributed to this debate through the lawyers and scholars’ advocacy for the application of 
the Constitution. On the government side, however, a trend against constitutionalism has 
been prevailing and impeding the attempt to apply Constitutional rules in each case.  
While there were hopes in late 2012 that the Constitution could provide a basis to re-build 
some consensus around a political reform agenda, the campaign against constitutionalism 
aimed at re-ideologizing the constitution in order to reduce it to a political slogan. Thus 
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quarantining off from public debate the very goal of constitutionalism as a proxy for political 
reform.  
As Party leaders perceived a decline in their power to “guide public opinion” (yulun 
daoxiang) and in the privileges they drew from treating the judicial system as an 
administrative body, they came to see themselves as increasingly embattled in a “public 
opinion struggle” (yulun douzheng) over the meaning of China’s laws and Constitution. As a 
result, they responded by mobilizing the Party’s “stability maintenance” and propaganda 
apparatus with the goal to regain control over emerging civil society forces. Consequently, 
“public opinion supervision” (yulun jiandu) in traditional and new media became more 
unpredictable.  
Instead of responding to the aspirations of a pluralizing Chinese society, Xi Jinping’s 
government has been employing increasingly repressive measures such as arbitrary arrests 
and detentions that incite fear and self-censorship. The revival of a Maoist language 
reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution also re-activated a friend/enemy worldview that has 
been used as a justification to discard the principle of equal individual rights before the law.  
Ultimately, the “dream of constitutionalism” largely depends on the Party leaders’ 
willingness to engage in political reforms. At the same time, if they continue their obsessive 
quest for “rigid stability maintenance” (gangxing weiwen) and “discursive power” (huayu 
quan) as the main governing tools to respond to domestic calls for the implementation of 
their own Constitution, the problems raised by constitutional advocates will not just disappear 
because they are jailed or silenced. For instance, as the lawyer Fu Minrong observed as 
regards the problem of corruption, “if Xi gets his way in the name of ‘sweeping away 
corruption’ while he is also ‘sweeping away constitutionalism,’ the root causes of corruption 
won't be addressed until laws get in line with the constitution and institutions implement 
them. Instead a new anti-corruption agency, it would be better if the courts could start doing 
their job: apply the Constitution under the supervision of watchful citizens.”62 
For the time being, while an increasing number of Chinese citizens seem to find 
Constitutionalism ever more important, it is clear that the Chinese authorities regard 
Constitutionalism as a dangerous vision that has the potential to challenge the very 
foundations of their political system. But as long as those in power choose to repress the 
fundamental constitutional rights in cases such as Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, the voices of 
Chinese citizens advocating for Constitutionalism are unlikely to remain silent. 
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